2002 Yearend: Afghanistan optimism
(Part of UPI's Special Report reviewing
2002 and previewing 2003)
By THOMAS HOULAHAN
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- As Afghanistan approaches the New Year, there is reason for cautious optimism. The country began its journey into the future with almost nothing, but so far, the authorities that replaced the Taliban have made all the right moves, and they have had help.
The government has shown uncommon wisdom since last November, when the Taliban regime collapsed. Basically, the Taliban's soldiers just went home and the Northern Alliance let them.
Meanwhile, throughout the country, essential services continued to be provided by the bureaucrats sometimes referred to as Afghanistan's "Cynical Service." Many of these officials had served the warlords when they ran Afghanistan, grown beards and continued to serve under the Taliban when it took over, and were back at their desks without their beards when the Taliban regime disintegrated. The Northern Alliance chose not to hold their previous work against them.
While many would have preferred to see everyone involved with the Taliban punished, these moves brought a quick end to the fighting and a quick beginning to reconstruction. Foreign aid helped feed the population, which grew by 1 million persons in the first six months of 2002 as refugees returned. At the same time, soldiers from the United States and its allies kept al Qaida from regrouping and causing trouble for the new government.
In December 2001, United Nations-sponsored talks in Bonn produced an interim government, the Afghan Interim Authority. Hamid Karzai was elected to head the AIA, which had a six-month term. Well-educated and articulate, Karzai has inspired sufficient confidence from the West to attract nearly $5 billion in foreign aid. Approximately $2 billion of that aid will have been dispensed in 2002 and the remainder over the next four years.
Since the fall of the Taliban, the United States has provided more than $440 million of assistance to Afghanistan. Most of this has been in the form of U.S. Agency for International Development programs to provide food, blankets and shelter. After basic needs are addressed, USAID will shift its focus to housing, roads, bridges and agriculture rehabilitation (a serious drought in 1999 laid waste a great deal of agricultural land).
The World Bank has provided $100 million in immediate assistance. This has been used for housing, public works, like the restoration of water, power and sanitation, education, and a public administration program. The World Bank is expected to provide another $470 million in the next two years.
The Asian Development Bank will provide up to $500 million by 2004. Meanwhile, the United Nations has provided $2 million worth of cargo trucks and snow plowing equipment.
In June 2002, the Loya Jirga, Afghanistan's traditional assembly, appointed a transitional government with a term of eighteen months. The Loya Jirga selected Hamid Karzai to head the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Though a Pashtun, many Pashtuns distrust Karzai because of his association with the Northern Alliance. For this reason, the participation of King Mohammed Zahir Shah, also a Pashtun, as a figurehead has been crucial.
Completely independent of the Northern Alliance, the king's participation increases the Pashtuns' comfort level. The comfort level of other ethnic groups has been raised by the inclusion of their members in prominent cabinet posts.
All the major ethnic groups are represented among Karzai's five vice-chairmen. The defense minister, General Mohammed Fahim, is a Tajik. The minister of Water and Electricity, Shaker Kargar, is an Uzbek. Hazaras head the ministries of Planning (Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq) and Women's Affairs (Sima Samar). The Ministry of Finance is headed by a Pashtun, Hedayat Amin Arsala. The there is similar diversity in the 24 remaining cabinet posts.
Attempts have been made to create a national army. The U.N.'s International Security Assistance Force has recruited and trained a multi-ethnic force of a few thousand with men drawn from throughout Afghanistan. The United States has set aside $50 million to train and equip 18,000 more men.
Ironically, in this effort, the United States Army is competing against itself. While American soldiers have been training the Kabul army, U.S. Special Forces units have been training, equipping and paying units to hunt down al Qaida operatives. These units have drawn from the forces of, and operate in cooperation with, local warlords. Recruiting for the Kabul force has been made difficult by the higher pay offered in the warlord-centered units.
Efforts to field an army loyal to the Kabul government have been viewed with a certain amount of concern in Afghanistan. Some Pashtun, Uzbek and Hazara leaders are concerned that the army might become a tool of a Tajik-dominated government and eventually turned on them. Fortunately, the main warlords seem to realize that the army's prospects of ever reaching that level of power are slim.
As a practical matter, the Kabul government will never have enough money to field an army large enough to bring Afghanistan's military chieftains to heel by force. In any case, there has been no indication that the Kabul government intends to use the army for that purpose.
So far, though none of them have shown any sign that they are willing to disarm, the warlords have not fought with the government or each other. Many are still working with American operatives in the hunt for al Qaida terrorists, and are benefiting financially from the relationship.
In an exercise of political common sense, Gen. Rashid Dostum has been brought into the government. An Uzbek leader with a history of opportunistic side-switching, Dostum was once seen as the most significant threat to the stability of the government. However, he seems satisfied with his appointment as deputy defense minister of the transitional government.
Meanwhile, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the warlord most hostile to the government, has been marginalized. Once the Soviets' strongest opponent during the occupation, Hekmatyar began to alienate the population after the Soviets left. In 1994, he ordered a bombardment of Kabul that resulted in an estimated 25,000 deaths. Once in power, the alienation continued. It was Hekmatyar who recommended that acid be thrown into the faces of women caught not wearing veils.
After being driven out of power by the Taliban, Hekmatyar fled to Iran. Claims by the CIA to the contrary, it is unlikely that Iran's support of Hekmatyar will ever amount to much more than a grant of safe haven.
The Iranian government would gain nothing by backing a losing horse when it already has two winners in its stable.
Ismail Khan and Mohammed Karim Khalili, the two most powerful chieftains in the Shi'ite strongholds of western Afghanistan, are on extremely friendly terms with Iran. Both are expected to remain on good terms with the government in Kabul as well, so long as there is no attempt by the government to impose its will in that region.